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OF OUTSIDE MONITORS AND INSIDE MONITORS:
THE ROLE OF JOURNALISTS IN CAREMARK
LITIGATION
Michael J. Borden*
ABSTRACT
In this article I argue for a change in Delaware corporate law that
would allow for competitive forces to improve the quality of corporate
compliance programs, thus reducing harm to society from corporate
illegality and improving shareholder welfare. Specifically, courts should
remove some obstacles that prevent plaintiffs in shareholder derivative
actions from forcing defendant directors to demonstrate the efficacy of
their compliance programs in cases where outside monitoring by journalists
appears to have detected illegal corporate actions before those actions have
been detected by the internal monitoring of the compliance department.
Currently, the rigorous demand requirement and the deferential good faith
standard in duty to monitor cases cause most Caremark claims to be
dismissed at the demand phase, thus shielding defendant directors from
revealing information about the performance of their compliance programs.
The changes I suggest will force corporate defendants to reveal information
that will allow courts to compare the monitoring performed by journalists
with that done by compliance programs. Where the outside monitors are
outperforming the inside monitors, directors may be responsible for failing
to perform their duty to monitor, which requires them to establish systems
to detect and report illegal behavior by employees. By implementing the
modest changes I suggest, Delaware courts will, over time, have more
information to help them assess whether their approach to the duty to
monitor needs a more thorough overhaul.
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INTRODUCTION
Competition lies at the heart of our capitalist system. It is an article of
faith among advocates of a laissez-faire approach to markets that
competition, and not governmental intervention, will allow for the most
efficient allocation of goods and services throughout an economy.
Corporate law provides one particularly pure example of this reluctance of
the state to interfere in private ordering. The business judgment rule, a
central principle of corporate law, on some level can scarcely be called a
legal principle at all. Rather, it is a doctrine of abstinence founded on the
notion that courts should refrain from meddling in the corporate
boardroom. Yet as we have seen with disheartening regularity in the years
since Enron’s collapse, competitive forces in markets do not always serve
to prevent corporate actors from causing tremendous harm to shareholders
and society by engaging in wrongful activities of various sorts.
Corporate law makes a token effort to induce corporate directors to
reduce the likelihood of such malfeasance by imposing a duty to monitor,
which requires that corporations have compliance departments tasked with
ensuring that corporate employees abide by applicable law. This article
argues that the duty to monitor, in its current form, is too weak to cause
corporations to establish truly effective compliance programs. I argue that
journalists can serve as outside monitors that compete with the inside
monitoring performed by compliance programs. In cases where the outside
monitors outperform the inside monitors, the law should allow shareholder
plaintiffs to use that fact to overcome the procedural hurdles that usually
prevent them from surviving a motion to dismiss when they sue. By
relaxing these procedural obstacles, the law will allow competitive forces
to create pressure on corporations to do more to avoid socially harmful and
shareholder wealth-reducing illegality.
There is good reason to believe that journalists can be effective
monitors of corporate wrongdoing. The summer of 2012 saw the
revelation of a stunning international banking scandal that demonstrated
journalists’ ability to serve the public good by detecting and reporting
corporate criminality. The LIBOR rate-setting scandal serves as an
instance of a purely market-based process manipulated by powerful
insiders to the detriment of those who rely on the integrity of international
lending rates. Gary Gensler, the chairman of the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission, revealed that “there were articles in the spring of
2008 by the Wall Street Journal” following which “staff and [CFTC’s]
division of enforcement started to take a look . . . and tried to learn” about
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the scandal.1 Gensler’s comments suggest that regulators and the public
depend on journalists to assist in law enforcement and to ensure that
markets function. Corporate law should take advantage of this extralegal
constraint by modifying the duty to monitor to clear the way for journalists
to make their contributions.
Over fifteen years have passed since Chancellor Allen’s celebrated
opinion in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, and
courts, lawyers, and scholars are still struggling with a fundamental
question of corporate law and governance: to what extent are corporate
directors responsible for monitoring the behavior of corporate employees
and ensuring their compliance with the law? This question is so important
because, apart from raising interesting and difficult legal questions, it
implicates social issues that have captured the nation’s attention since the
Enron and WorldCom scandals, and more recently with the mortgage
finance catastrophe and the LIBOR scandal. In this respect, Caremark
litigation differs from many other topics in corporate law, which mainly
concern the relationship between shareholders and boards of directors.
These recent corporate fiascos have demonstrated that social harms
that can result from a failure of oversight and the corporate culture of
lawlessness it can engender. However, corporate law does not provide an
easy answer to the question of if or how to hold directors liable for the
wrongs of corporate employees. On one hand, the board is the entity
charged by statute with the duty to manage the affairs of the corporation.
Thus, it may seem desirable to lay responsibility for corporate wrongdoing
at the feet of directors. On the other hand, a directorship of a public
corporation is in reality a part-time job held by individuals with many other
significant responsibilities. It may be unreasonable to expect directors to
ensure that none of a corporation’s thousands of employees harm the
corporation or the public by breaking the law.
Caremark and its progeny have attempted to resolve this dilemma by
fashioning a duty to monitor that requires boards to establish, in good faith,
a reasonably designed information and reporting system—a compliance
program—to monitor adherence to positive law. While no one would
argue that compliance programs are a bad thing, the decade and a half of
litigation following Caremark has demonstrated that the “in good faith”
standard is mostly snarl, with very little bite. This deferential standard,
combined with well-entrenched procedural hurdles, create the risk that
compliance programs can become paper tigers: legally sufficient to pass
Caremark muster, but practically ineffective to prevent wrongdoing. The
1. The Diane Rehm Show: The Global Banking Scandal (WAMU 88.5 FM
Washington DC broadcast Jul. 9, 2012), http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2012-0709/global-banking-scandal/transcript).
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jurisprudence suggests that the threat of liability is not a serious concern for
directors. Of the 248 cases brought under Delaware law alleging
Caremark-type violations, only fourteen times did the Caremark claim
survive the motion to dismiss.2 Plaintiffs achieved an adjudication of
liability only once.3
One of the greatest barriers to success for plaintiffs in shareholder
derivative litigation is the Delaware rule, which denies discovery until after
the demand phase. Without discovery, plaintiffs are relegated to what the
Delaware courts call the “tools at hand,” mainly SEC filings, public
records, and news media reports. These tools have been insufficient to
generate the particularized facts the plaintiffs must plead to survive a
motion to dismiss. This Article will argue that courts should give particular
weight to journalists’ reports of corporate illegality, both at the demand
phase and when applying the substantive standard of good faith. This focus
on journalists expands on an earlier article I wrote titled The Role of
Financial Journalists in Corporate Governance. In that article, I surveyed
the various ways that financial journalists influence corporate law and
corporate governance. In the context of Caremark, I argued that journalists
could serve as a sort of competitive benchmark against which to assess the
efficacy of corporate compliance programs. I reasoned that if the external
monitoring by journalists could discover corporate wrongdoing before the
internal monitors are able to discover and report it to the board, then there
would be reason to suspect that the Caremark standard was, in fact,
promoting inert compliance systems.
Part I of this Article explains Caremark and its progeny, detailing its
development and the difficulties it presents for plaintiffs. Part II provides
background on the recent increase in scholarly attention paid to journalists’
impact on the law. Part III explores the role journalists have played in
Caremark litigation. In Part IV, I discuss my proposal for relaxing the
demand requirement and creating a presumption of bad faith when
journalistic reporting of illegality appears to predate any attempt by the
board to address the wrongdoing.

2. For examples of Caremark claims that failed to survive a motion to dismiss, see, e.g., In
re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003) (overturning the
district court’s granting of a motion to dismiss); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.
2001) (same); In re Pfizer Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 722 F. Supp. 2d 453, 461
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (excusing investors from making pre-suit demand on corporation’s board
after they demonstrated substantial likelihood that majority of board members faced
personal liability).
3. ATR-Kim Eng. Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. 489-N, 2006 WL 4782272, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 21, 2006).
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CAREMARK AND ITS PROGENY

Corporate employees, at all levels of the organizational structure,
sometimes break the law in their efforts to carry out the company’s
business. The consequences of such law-breaking can be severe, causing
significant losses of shareholder wealth. Such losses often prompt
shareholders to sue directors for damages to compensate the corporation for
the loss. At the heart of the law’s lenient response to such lawsuits is the
recognition that directors cannot be expected to know what every corporate
employee is doing, and thus cannot be held liable for every instance of law
breaking that harms the firm financially.4 Indeed, though it may not be
polite for courts to mention it, a degree of law-breaking in market conduct
often benefits shareholders. The courts have struggled for decades to find
an appropriate intermediate position between the extremes of making the
board the guarantor of corporate rectitude and encouraging an aloof,
“ignorance is bliss” attitude among directors.
A. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.5 was the first notable
case to explore this middle ground. In Graham, shareholders sued the
board for failing to prevent harm to the corporation caused by illegal price
fixing. Relying on a 19th century U.S. Supreme Court decision,6 the
Delaware Supreme Court ruled that directors could be held liable for
corporate illegality only if “something occurs to put them on suspicion that
something is wrong.”7 The Delaware Supreme Court disparaged the notion
that there was any “duty . . . to install . . . a corporate system of espionage
to ferret out wrongdoing.”8 In effect, the Graham court established the
“one-bite rule for dog owners” in the context of the duty to monitor.9 So
4. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of
Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 561 (2008) (“Directors are not expected
to know in minute detail everything that happens on a day-to-day basis . . . Delaware case
law was unclear for many years as to whether boards have an obligation to monitor
proactively the conduct of corporate subordinates.”).
5. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
6. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
7. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
8. Id.
9. See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 577-78 (analogizing the rule of Graham to the
aphorism that every dog is entitled to one bite. The authors explain, “At common law, of
course, the one-bite rule actually was somewhat more complicated. When a dog bit
someone, the master could be held liable only if the master knew or had reason to know the
dog had a propensity to bite. A prior bite would constitute the requisite knowledge, thus
giving rise to the colloquial name for the rule, but the requisite knowledge also could be
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long as there were no red flags indicating a likelihood of the wrongdoing in
question, the board could not be held responsible if it occurred. Perhaps
unwittingly, the Graham court thus established a legal environment in
which boards had an incentive to avoid discovering wrongdoing. In any
event, Graham did not impose an affirmative duty for Delaware
corporations to establish compliance programs. Graham remained good
law until 1996, when the Delaware Chancery handed down the Caremark10
decision—a landmark case that is seen as standing for the proposition that
corporate directors have an affirmative duty to monitor their corporations
for illegal activities.11
B. Caremark
Caremark International, Inc. was a Delaware corporation that
marketed medical products and services to patients and to medical
providers.12 In violation of federal Medicare and Medicaid law, Caremark
employees paid kickbacks to doctors and hospital administrators who
prescribed their products and services.13 A federal investigation of the
company culminated in Caremark paying $250 million in fines and
penalties.14 When shareholders sued the board of directors for the loss of
corporate wealth, the directors claimed that they were unaware of the
wrongdoing.15 Such a defense is entirely plausible, for directors generally
are not engaged in the day-to-day business operations of their firms.
Moreover, modern corporations are geographically diverse organizations
that often have thousands of employees and multiple layers of management
oversight. Under such circumstances, it would be harsh or unfeasible to
hold directors personally responsible for the harm caused by actors far
removed from the control of the the directors. Indeed, at the time of the
wrongdoing in Caremark, Delaware law under Graham held that so long as
directors were unaware of the unlawful activities that had caused the harm
to the corporation and had no reason to be aware of it, the directors were

based on the breed’s inherently violent propensities.”).
10. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
11. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del.
2006) (holding “that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for director
oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information
system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed
to monitor or oversee its operations . . . .”).
12. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 959-64.
13. Id. at 962.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 971.
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free from personal liability.16
In an opinion approving the settlement of the Caremark shareholders’
derivative action, Chancellor Allen acknowledged that Graham might be
seen as promoting blissful ignorance for directors and undertook to put the
law on a different footing.17 Allen asserted that if this interpretation of
Graham was really the law of Delaware, then it must change.18 In dicta,
Allen explained that in order to avoid liability for corporate wrongdoing,
the board must “exercise a good faith judgment that the corporation’s
information and reporting system is in concept and design adequate to
assure the board that appropriate information will come to its attention in a
timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations . . . .”19 In so doing,
Chancellor Allen moved the discussion about personal director liability
away from the business judgment rule and towards the rubric of the duty of
good faith.20
But good faith, by its nature, is a rather elastic and fact-dependent
concept. It is the sort of standard that typically leads to unpredictability in
litigation, leaving directors and the bar wondering about what behavior
amounts to good or bad faith. Perhaps eager to simplify this guessing
game, Chancellor Allen proceeded to clarify the meaning of good faith in
the context of the duty to monitor:
Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss
is predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities within
the corporation, . . . only a sustained or systematic failure of the
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to
assure a reasonable information and reporting system exits—will
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to
liability. Such a test of liability—lack of good faith as evidenced
by sustained or systematic failure of a director to exercise
reasonable oversight—is quite high.21
Chancellor Allen further opined that the sort of claim involved in the
case was “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which
a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”22 This is a strong statement,
16. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
17. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969-70.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 970.
20. In 2006, Stone v. Ritter made clear that the duty of good faith was not an
independent fiduciary duty, creating a “triumvirate” of fiduciary duties along with care and
loyalty. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
Rather, the duty of good faith falls under the duty of loyalty for doctrinal and analytical
purposes under Delaware law. Id.
21. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
22. Id. at 967.
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given the utter nullity that the waste doctrine has been for decades.23
In short, we can say that Caremark requires corporations to have a
compliance program reasonably designed in good faith. Corporate law
does not require that the program function; it merely must exist. In the
sixteen years since Caremark, plaintiffs have brought approximately 250
cases alleging violations of Delaware’s duty to monitor. The Caremark
claim survived a motion to dismiss only fourteen times. 24 Only one case
has produced a verdict for plaintiffs.25
There are several possible reasons why plaintiffs have fared so
dismally under Caremark. It may be that the good faith standard for
legally sufficient compliance programs is too low. It is also possible that
the vast majority of cases lacked merit. A third reason may be that the
demand requirement magnifies the difficulties shareholder plaintiffs face.26
In view of Chancellor Allen’s own prognosis, and the actual
experience of fifteen years of Caremark litigation, it is fair to wonder
whether the Caremark good faith standard has proven too deferential to
directors and whether it has promoted the creation and maintenance of
paper tigers—inert compliance programs that are legally sufficient but
inadequate to curb wrongdoing. With the vast majority of cases disposed
of on the pleadings, defendants are not required to demonstrate that the
compliance programs are actually performing their intended function:
monitoring corporate behavior to assure compliance with law and to report
relevant information to the board. The procedural advantage that
defendants enjoy shields them from having to prove the effectiveness of
their information and reporting systems. Indeed, even in the rare case that
does go to trial, the effectiveness of the compliance system is not even at
issue; it must be “in concept and design adequate to assure the board that
appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a
matter of ordinary operations . . . .”27 By focusing only on “concept and
design,” Chancellor Allen remained consistent with the general thrust of
23. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 46 (2004) (noting that “cases in which
it is possible to demonstrate ‘waste’ are—like the Loch Ness Monster—so rare as to be
possibly nonexistent.”).
24. See, e.g., In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir.
2003) (overturning the district court’s granting of a motion to dismiss); McCall v. Scott, 239
F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001) (same); In re Pfizer Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 722 F.
Supp. 2d 453, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (excusing investors from making pre-suit demand on
corporation’s board after they demonstrated substantial likelihood that majority of board
members faced personal liability).
25. ATR-Kim Eng. Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. 489-N, 2006 WL 4782272, at *1, *20
(Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006).
26. For further discussion of the demand requirement, see infra section D.
27. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
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Delaware corporate law. It is a bedrock tenet of the business judgment rule
that the director’s duty of care involves only the process of decisionmaking, not the substantive decision reached.28 Unfortunately, this analytic
consistency of deference to directorial autonomy may come at a steep price
for shareholders and society, as the numerous corporate scandals of the past
decade have demonstrated.
C. Stone v. Ritter: An Exercise in Taxonomy
Caremark’s doctrinal impact on shareholder derivative litigation
cannot be fully grasped without considering Stone ex rel. AmSouth
Bancorporation v. Ritter,29 a 2006 case that both adopted Caremark’s dicta
as the law of Delaware and radically re-interpreted its doctrinal
foundations.30 Caremark’s analysis of a board’s duty of good faith in
exercising oversight appeared to be grounded in the duty of care. For
example, the opinion stated that “the core element of any corporate law
duty of care inquiry” is “whether there was good faith effort to be informed
and exercise judgment.”31
What should be understood, but may not be widely considered by
courts or commentators, is that compliance with a director’s duty of care
can never be judicially determined by reference to the content of the board
decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good
faith or rationality of the process employed.32
The Stone court thus faced a Caremark decision that seemed to
commit Delaware law to two doctrinal positions: first, that good faith was
the touchstone for any analysis of a claim of a board’s failure to exercise
appropriate oversight, and, second, that such a claim was grounded in the
duty of care. Stone embraced the first concept but emphatically discarded
the second.33 The years immediately following Caremark saw a degree of
confusion concerning the appropriate place of good faith in the taxonomy
of corporate fiduciary duties. Some in the Delaware bar and bench had
begun to embrace a view of Delaware corporate law as embodying a triad
of fiduciary duties: care, loyalty, and good faith.34 This view of fiduciary
28. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“As for the plaintiffs’
contention that the directors failed to exercise ‘substantive due care,’ we should note that
such a concept is foreign to the business judgment rule . . . . Due care in the decisionmaking
context is process due care only.”).
29. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
30. Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 585-86.
31. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
32. Id.
33. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70.
34. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (“The directors
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duties was the subject of some handwringing, among both judges and
scholars.35 The Stone court put an end to this construct, clarifying that “the
obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary
duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty,” but
rather is subsumed by the duty of loyalty.36
The decision to place the duty of good faith under the rubric of the
duty of loyalty has interesting implications for shareholder suits. Steven
Bainbridge suggests that Stone’s placement of good faith in the duty of
loyalty threatens the coherence of the system of remedies available under
the duty of loyalty.37 Bainbridge notes that Stone expands the duty of
loyalty beyond its traditional bounds by including cases in which directors
do not receive a personal benefit.38 Consequently, the remedies available in
loyalty cases will change. Before Stone, remedies in loyalty cases aimed at
requiring defendants to disgorge benefits wrongfully gained. For example,
in corporate opportunity cases, the corporation receives a constructive trust
in the opportunity.39 In interested director cases, the court may void the
related party transaction.40 After Stone, duty of loyalty cases under the duty
to monitor will involve claims for damages without a corresponding
of Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties”); McMullin v. Beran, 765
A.2d 910, 920 (Del. 2000) (noting that plaintiffs must successfully allege breach of one of
the “triad of fiduciary duties of care, loyalty or good faith”); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5,
10 (Del. 1998) (en banc) (“The director’s fiduciary duty to both the corporation and its
shareholders has been characterized by this Court as a triad: due care, good faith, and
loyalty.”).
35. See, e.g., Robert Baker, In re Walt Disney: What It Means to the Definition of
Good Faith, Exculpatory Clauses, and the Nature of Executive Compensation, 4 FLA. ST. U.
BUS. REV. 261, 267-68 (2005) (discussing the duty of good faith); Carter G. Bishop, A Good
Faith Revival of Duty of Care Liability in Business Organization Law, 41 TULSA L. REV.
477, 482-83 (2006) (noting that “because loyalty, care, and good faith are not uniformly
triadic, divergent corporate law standards . . . ha[ve] lead to intolerable confusion and
incoherence.”); Matthew R. Berry, Comment, Does Delaware’s Section 102(b)(7) Protect
Reckless Directors From Personal Liability? Only if Delaware Courts Act in Good Faith,
79 WASH. L. REV. 1125, 1128 (2004) (“Delaware courts do not agree whether the duty of
good faith is an independent fiduciary duty or merely a part of the duty of loyalty, but courts
do agree that directors who act in bad faith are personally liable for any resulting
damages.”).
36. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
37. Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 585-86. See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of
Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006) (critiquing the placement of
Caremark claims in the duty of loyalty); Leo E. Srine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hammermesh, R.
Franklin Balotti, Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: the Defining Role of Good
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010) (explaining that the duty of loyalty is, at
its core, “the obligation to act in good faith to advance the best interests of the
corporation.”).
38. Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 585-86.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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wrongful benefit to the defendants. Bainbridge argues that such claims
could raise challenging issues of causation that have not, to date, been part
of litigation under the duty of loyalty.41
But other effects of this re-configuration of the taxonomy of
shareholder claims are likely to prove beneficial for shareholder plaintiffs,
and thus may be beneficial to shareholder welfare generally. As corporate
law scholars have recognized,42 by placing good faith claims under the duty
of loyalty and clarifying that they do not implicate the duty of care,
Delaware courts have removed them from the exculpatory ambit of section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.43 Section 102(b)(7)
permits corporations to include in their charters a provision insulating
directors from liability for breaches of fiduciary duties, but section
102(b)(7) prohibits exculpation in cases involving breaches of the duty of
loyalty or for actions not in good faith.44 It is evident, then, that one of the
consequences (if not the purpose) of Stone’s taxonomic maneuver was to
remove Caremark claims from the class of cases in which directors enjoy
immunity from liability. But this benefit only partially clears the very
uncertain path to a monetary recovery for shareholder plaintiffs.
From the plaintiff’s perspective, the entire process of derivative
litigation may seem like a cruel joke. The set-up is a series of nearly
insurmountable obstacles (no discovery, the onerous demand requirement,
special litigation committees empowered to dismiss the rare case that
survives the demand phase, and director-protective substantive rules of
decision like the business judgment rule) and the punch line is section
102(b)(7). Stone, at a minimum, provides some relief for plaintiffs.
D. The Demand Requirement
Another important piece of the puzzle in Caremark litigation, as in all
shareholder derivative suits, is the demand requirement—the most
formidable of the procedural obstacles shareholder plaintiffs encounter.
Because the real plaintiff in interest in a shareholder derivative action is the
corporation itself, and because the board is the only entity with the
authority to manage the affairs of the corporation, the law requires
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of
Directors to Assert Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law As a
Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of
Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 116-17 (2004) (“[C]ourts and commentators seem
to agree that an exculpatory charter provision precludes monetary liability for pure ‘duty of
care’ claims and not for duty of loyalty or ‘good faith’ claims.”).
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013).
44. Id.
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shareholders to make a demand upon the board to bring the action that the
shareholders are pressing.45 The demand requirement may be excused,
however, if the plaintiffs can demonstrate that demand would be futile.46
Since claims of failure to monitor usually involve nonfeasance, rather
than an affirmative decision taken by the board, recent Caremark cases
have employed the test of Rales v. Blasband47 to analyze demand futility.48
The Rales test requires plaintiffs to establish reasonable doubt that “as of
the time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have properly
exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in
responding to a demand.”49 Demand in a Caremark case will be excused as
futile if the plaintiffs can plead “particularized facts that support an
inference that the directors ‘did possess knowledge of facts suggesting
potential . . . improprieties . . . and took no action to respond to them.’”50
The test for demand futility intertwines with the substantive standard
for success on the merits under Caremark and Stone. As the court
explained in McCall v. Scott, demand will be excused if the particularized
facts alleged in the complaint present a substantial likelihood of liability on
the part of the director.51 Assuming that a majority of board members are
named as defendants, such a showing would suffice to raise the requisite
reasonable doubt that the board as a whole would be unlikely to exercise
independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to the
demand. The reasoning employed by the McCall court ruling for the
plaintiffs on the demand issue suggests that in certain cases, overcoming
the demand requirement might be an attainable goal. But it is important to
recognize that McCall was decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
applying Delaware law. Recent Delaware cases give plaintiffs less reason
for optimism.

45. See White v. Panic, 793 A.2d 356, 371 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“[R]equiring demand in
failure to monitor cases is consistent with the board’s managerial prerogatives because it
permits the board to have the opportunity to take action where it has not previously
considered doing so”) (internal quotations omitted).
46. Id. at 371
47. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993).
48. See Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008) (“The second (Rales) test
applies where the subject of a derivative suit is not a business decision of the Board but
rather a violation of the Board’s oversight duties.”); DeSimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908,
913 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[T]he question of whether [Plaintiff] has satisfied his burden under
Rule 23.1 must be answered by applying the test set forth in Rales v. Blasband.”); McCall v.
Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 816 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[B]ecause this case involved the ‘absence of a
conscious board decision,’ demand futility should be evaluated under the Rales test.”).
49. Rales, 634 A.2d at 934.
50. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506-07 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2003) (quoting Ash v.
McCall, No. Civ.A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000)).
51. McCall, 239 F.3d at 818-19.
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In Wood v. Baum, the Delaware Supreme Court explained that a
“plaintiff must also plead particularized facts that demonstrate that the
directors acted with scienter, i.e., that they had ‘actual or constructive
knowledge’ that their conduct was legally improper.”52 In DeSimone v.
Barrows, the Court of Chancery asserted that:
[I]n order to state a viable Caremark claim . . . a plaintiff must
plead the existence of facts suggesting that the board knew that
internal controls were inadequate, that the inadequacies could
leave room for illegal or materially harmful behavior, and that the
board chose to do nothing about the control deficiencies that it
knew existed.53
The difficulty with the scienter requirement is that it is very difficult
for plaintiffs to plead particularized facts about what the directors knew
without the benefit of discovery. Whether under the Rales test or the older
Aronson54 test, a large majority of shareholder derivative actions meet their
end at the demand phase of the litigation. Yet, as mentioned previously,
plaintiffs must obtain the particularized facts needed to establish demand
futility without the benefit of discovery.
The dictum from DeSimone indicates a gap between the jurisprudence
of demand in the Delaware courts and the approach taken in cases like
McCall. Note that the focus is on the board’s knowledge of the
deficiencies of internal controls, not on the board’s knowledge of any
particular information about a given instance of illegality. Only knowledge
of a systematic failure of the structure of compliance will suffice to allow a
plaintiff to demonstrate demand futility.55 Moreover, even if a plaintiff
were able to demonstrate a structural deficiency in internal controls, such a
showing could still be inadequate, for the plaintiff might not be able to
show the board’s knowledge of the deficiency. The incentive remains for
directors to remain willfully ignorant of flaws in their compliance
programs.
It is evident, then, that in the microcosm of demand, we see a
recapitulation of the broader issues surrounding the duty to monitor:
directors cannot have knowledge of everything that occurs within a
corporation and thus cannot be held liable for illegality of which they were
ignorant. Even so, directors who remain unaware of the internal controls
within the compliance program can rest assured that the demand
requirement will not be excused. The solution to this Gordian knot is to
embrace the McCall court’s approach to demand futility. In Part IV, I will
52.
53.
54.
55.

Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008).
DeSimone, 924 A.2d 908, 940 (Del. Ch. 2007).
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
DeSimone, 924 A.2d at 940.
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discuss this solution in the context of cases involving journalistic reporting
of corporate malfeasance.
E. Red Flags
Although Caremark represents a fundamental shift away from the
jurisprudence of Graham, Delaware law maintains an important part of the
analysis that prevailed under Graham, the concept of the red flag.
Caremark, although turning Graham on its head, did not affect discussions
of red flags in cases and law review articles.56
So what is a red flag? In concept, a red flag is a warning, an
indication of the presence of a risk. It is a signal to slow down and apprise
oneself of the nature of the risk and to adjust course if necessary. Red flags
can arise in many contexts, as recent cases, including McCall v. Scott,57
have illustrated. A red flag can be a report from the compliance program,58
the initiation of a governmental investigation or a private lawsuit,59 a
warning from external auditors that they are concerned about their ability to
issue a clean opinion on a financial statement can be a red flag,60 or a
newspaper report detailing illegal behavior.61 More subtle red flags can be
found in aberrations in internally generated data.62 The directors in McCall
had almost all of these red flags waved before them.63
Although we can view Graham as the origin of the proposition that red
flags put a board on notice of a particular instance of the duty to monitor, it
is interesting to note that in Graham itself, the court was reluctant to take
the idea too seriously. The plaintiffs in Graham argued that a 1937 consent
decree should have sufficed to inform the board that there was a “biting
dog” on the premises.64 The court was not persuaded that the decree was

56. See, e.g., In re SFBC Int’l Sec. and Derivative Litig., 495 F. Supp. 2d 477, 485
(D.N.J. 2007) (“The Complaint, however, alleges endemic mismanagement of the company,
raising plenty of red flags concerning the improper and even possibly illegal practices in
which the company was engaged.”); In re Baxter Int’l, Inc. S’holders Litig., 654 A.2d 1268,
1271 (Del.Ch.1995) (“[T]he complaint does not plead with particularity what obvious
danger signs were ignored or what additional measures the directors should have taken.”).
57. McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2001).
58. Id. at 818-21.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., id. (finding a red flag where, in a Medicaid case, the highest bracket
billing claims rose from 31% to 76% and then to 93%, when the hospital across the street
was only billing 28% of its claims at the highest rate).
63. Id.
64. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 129 (Del. 1963).
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“cause for suspicion”65 so as to require the directors to “ferret out
wrongdoing.”66 In recent decades, courts have applied more careful
judicial scrutiny of circumstances that ought to pique a board’s attention
and thus implicate the duty to monitor.
In Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., the court agreed with
the plaintiffs that an abrupt shift in lending patterns between Montgomery
Cellular Holding Company (“MCHC”) and its affiliates raised a red flag. 67
The facts of the case showed that during an earlier phase of the company’s
operations, entities affiliated with MCHC had advanced money to MCHC,
with the outstanding amount totaling $12 million.68 After a change of
control of the company, the advances began flowing in the opposite
direction, with MCHC advancing funds in excess of $13 million to its
affiliates.69 In response to these facts, the court stated that “while
‘advances’ to affiliates in some contexts may be entirely proper, the
plaintiffs have provided credible evidence that these ‘advances’ are
suspect.”70 The willingness of the Dobler court to treat this conceivably
innocuous pattern of transactions as a red flag indicates that the courts have
evolved since Graham.
This is not to say, however, that the Delaware courts have uniformly
embraced an expansive approach to red flags. In In re Citigroup Inc.
Shareholders Litigation, for example, the Court of Chancery dismissed a
complaint for failure to show that demand should be excused, indicating a
restrictive attitude toward red flags.71 The plaintiffs had brought the action
against Citigroup in the wake of the collapse of Enron Corporation,
claiming that Citigroup had been complicit in Enron’s fraudulent offbalance sheet financing.72 The following paragraph from the court’s
opinion reveals the problems courts have had in defining what constitutes a
red flag in duty to monitor cases:
At argument, in response to questioning by the court, the
plaintiffs’ counsel suggested that the Amended Complaint
adequately alleges a series of “red flags” that should have put the
director defendants on notice of the offensive conduct or the
weakness of the corporation’s internal controls.
Further
65. Id. at 133.
66. Id.
67. Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co. Inc., No. Civ.A. 18105 NC, Civ.A.
18499, 2001 WL 1334182, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2001).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 19827, 2003 WL 21384599, at *2 (Del.
Ch. June 5, 2003).
72. Id.
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questioning revealed, however, that these “red flags” are
comprised of a series of internal corporate memoranda and emails disseminated at the level of Citigroup’s operating
subsidiaries. There is nothing in the Amended Complaint to
suggest or to permit the court to infer that any of these ever came
to the attention of the board of directors or any committee of the
board. How, exactly, a member of the Citigroup board of
directors was supposed to be put on inquiry notice by something
he or she never saw or heard of is not explained. The answer to
the question is obvious. “Red flags” are only useful when they
are either waived in one’s face or displayed so that they are
visible to the careful observer. 73
Assuming that these internal memoranda detailed Citigroup’s
knowledge of or involvement in the accounting irregularities at Enron, the
court’s refusal to label the documents as a red flag seems troubling. At a
minimum, it is difficult to reconcile this position with the treatment of the
pattern of advances in Dobler, a case decided just two years earlier.
It appears that the difference between the two cases lies in the scale of
the corporation in question. MCHC was a small cellular phone service,
with relatively few employees and, presumably, close contact among all the
parties involved. In such firms, the board is likely to have a much more
comprehensive view of the totality of the transactions the firm undertakes.
By contrast, at an institution such as Citigroup, the scope of operations, the
worldwide footprint, the enormous volume of transactions, and the
significant outside demands on its high-profile directors makes it easier for
a court to conclude that memoranda distributed at executive meetings of
corporate subsidiaries are somehow invisible to the board of directors of
the parent corporation. This conclusion, however, undercuts the entire
conception of the duty to monitor under Caremark. Caremark’s scheme of
monitoring and compliance is premised on the recognition that directors of
large corporations usually are unable to have actual knowledge of the dayto-day events in the life of their firms. For this reason, the law permits
them to delegate their compliance obligations to employees who sift
through voluminous information and funnel significant nuggets of
information upward to the board. To say that the memoranda were not red
flags because the board never saw them is to miss the point entirely, and
also suggests that such firms are, from the point of view of ethics and
compliance, too big to manage.
In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative S’holders Litig.74 is also a useful
case for understanding the Delaware courts’ conception of red flags.
73. Id.
74. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003).
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Abbott Laboratories involved the company’s non-compliance with Food
and Drug Administration regulations in the manufacture of medical
diagnostic devices and kits.75 After performing a routine inspection of
Abbott Labs’ facilities, the FDA sent the company “formal certified
Warning Letters.”76 The Wall Street Journal ran a story reporting on the
FDA’s concerns.77 Two years passed without the company remedying the
problems. This led to more Warning Letters and more news reports.78
Finally, after six years of noncompliance, with the accompanying
regulatory Warning Letters and ample coverage in the press, the FDA filed
a complaint in federal court, along with a consent decree.79 Under the
consent decree, Abbott Labs agreed to pay a $100 million fine, suspend
operations until it was in full compliance, and withdraw and destroy
previously manufactured kits worth an estimated $250 million.80
In denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court emphasized
the board’s failure to act upon the numerous red flags and held that the
complaint supported a theory of liability based on a “conscious disregard of
a known risk” or severe recklessness.81 Hillary Sale nicely summarized the
Abbott Laboratories case and the significance of red flags:
The allegations, of course, had not been proved. They are,
however, revealing about when boards can get in trouble for not
insisting on better internal information or for not intensifying
their monitoring or changing their approach when the situation
warrants. In the face of red flags, boards need to ask questions
and question answers. The failure to do so raises questions about
whether the board has fulfilled its good-faith obligations and
about whether the board has acted with “conscious disregard” of
its responsibilities or engaged in behavior sufficiently egregious
to surface concerns about intentionality.82
If the good faith standard hinges on what the directors knew, or ought
to have known, and it is not possible to get discovery to determine what the
directors actually knew because of demand requirements, then the focus for
plaintiffs shifts to a determination of what they ought to have known. My
claim is that defendants ought to know what is written about their firms in
the newspapers for two reasons. First, such information is now public, and,
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
(2007).

Id. at 799
Id.
Id. at 800.
Id.
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id. at 811.
Hillary Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 742
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as long as it appears in a prominent national publication, there is no reason
to constrain the concept of constructive knowledge so as to exclude it.
Second, if the information could be discovered by an outside journalist
relying on only his own initiative and shoe leather, then that information is
the type that a reasonably well-designed and implemented compliance
program ought to have discovered and communicated to the board. Either
way, the information ought to be sufficient to raise genuine issues of
material fact about either the board’s actual knowledge or the adequacy of
the compliance program so as to allow the plaintiffs to survive the motion
to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment. By allowing such cases
to continue beyond the summary judgment phase, Delaware would enable
competitive forces to test the efficacy of the compliance program under
review, and would put all corporations on notice that their compliance
programs will have to perform at least as well as the outside monitoring
carried out by journalists. Part IV will expand on this claim.
II.

SCHOLARLY ATTENTION TO THE ROLE OF NEWS MEDIA IN
LAW

The remainder of this article will concern itself with the possibility
that corporate monitors outside of the firm, namely journalists, can make
and have made positive contributions to Caremark litigation and, by
extension, to both corporate governance and social welfare. It will also
describe a plan by which the courts can step out of the way of competitive
forces that can improve corporate compliance programs.
A. The Recent Surge in Attention to Journalism in Legal Scholarship
In recent years, legal scholars have begun focusing their attention in a
more serious fashion on the role of journalism and the news media in law.
Law review articles for decades had been rife with cursory references to the
supporting role that news media might play in legal reform, public
awareness of legal issues, and the process of litigation. However, beyond
these superficial, if ubiquitous, mentions, precious little in the way of
careful, systematic investigations of the role of journalism in law could be
found in the literature.
In the last decade, however, scores of articles have touched on the
intersection of law and journalism. This is a natural topic in areas of law
and legal practice that intimately connect with the news media. Thus,
much legal literature focuses on the intersection of journalism and the first
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amendment.83 Similarly, articles exploring the techniques lawyers may
employ in using journalists as public relations tools in managing litigation
are plentiful.84 The years since the Valerie Plame–Scooter Libby affair
have seen a burst of law review articles on the journalistic privilege to keep
anonymous sources hidden from governmental inquiry.85 Other literature
concerns the portrayal of racial minorities in the media and its effect on
criminal law and procedure and the rights of defendants.86
83. See, e.g., Eunnice Eun, Journalists Caught in the Crossfire: Robert Novak, the
First Amendment, and Journalist’s Duty of Confidentiality, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1073,
1073 (2005) (“[J]ournalists should be able to publish information in the public interest
without being restrained by fear of criminal charges.”); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen
Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 522 (2007) (“Since the
1970s the Court has routinely rejected claims that the press was entitled to any special First
Amendment protections that the public at large did not equally enjoy.”); Mark Weidemaier,
Balancing, Press Immunity, and the Compatibility of Tort Law with the First Amendment,
82 MINN. L. REV. 1695, 1697 (1998) (“The press enjoys substantial newsgathering freedom,
and there is currently little evidence that newsgathering tort suits have substantial First
Amendment implications.”).
84. See, e.g., Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion,
Installment One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1259, 1283 (2009) (“[L]awyers must ensure that the right information is disclosed in the
proper manner and PR executives help the lawyer determine what a consumer or stockholder
might consider ‘material’ and therefore necessary to disclose.”); Kathleen F. Brickey, From
Boardroom to Courtroom to Newsroom: The Media and the Corporate Governance
Scandals, 33 J. CORP. L. 625, 659-60 (2008) (noting how “[t]he combination of articles,
background information, documents, exhibits, transcripts, and blogs available via the
Internet . . . allowed interested members of the public to learn about the rise and fall of
Enron and to follow the trial on a real-time basis.”).
85. See, e.g., Mark Gomsak, The Free Flow of Information Act of 2006: Settling the
Journalist’s Privilege Debate, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 599 (2007) (“This Note posits that a
federally legislated qualified journalist’s privilege would . . . curb the judiciary’s disregard
of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources . . . .”); William E. Lee, The Priestly Class:
Reflections on A Journalist’s Privilege, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 636 (2006)
(“[M]any journalists regard judicial orders compelling the identification of confidential
sources as an ‘assault on journalistic freedom.’”); Jeffrey S. Nestler, The Underprivileged
Profession: The Case for Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist’s Privilege, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 201, 204 (2005) (“The phrase ‘freedom of the press’ . . . can support the creation
of a privilege protecting reporters from having to reveal the nature of confidential
information they received from sources who wished to remain anonymous.”).
86. See, e.g., Neil. F. Carlson & Leonard M. Baynes, Rethinking the Discourse on
Race: A Symposium on How the Lack of Racial Diversity in the Media Affects Social Justice
and Policy, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 575, 579 (2007) (noting that media coverage
of Hurricane Katrina “confirmed and fed into existing negative stereotypes of African
Americans as violent and prone to crime.”); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of
the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social
Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1261-75 (1992) (documenting the social construction of
racial stereotypes, particularly through entertainment and pop-culture media); John
Tehranian, The Last Minstrel Show? Racial Profiling, the War on Terrorism and the Mass
Media, 41 CONN. L. REV. 781, 798 (2009) (“Racial profiling in the war on terrorism has
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Legal scholars have paid somewhat less attention to the intersection of
journalism and other legal topics. One can find far fewer articles on the
impact of journalists on topics such as environmental law,87 bankruptcy,88
and antitrust law.89 In recent years, a small body of literature has emerged
on the role of journalists in corporate and securities law and corporate
governance.90
In a 2007 article, I surveyed the roles of financial journalists in
corporate law and corporate governance.91 The article arose from the
recognition, in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, that
corporate law can only go so far in promoting its goal of minimizing the
agency costs that arise from the divergence of ownership and management
that is the hallmark of the corporate form.92 Without effective enforcement
mechanisms, the law has only a limited capacity to affect the behavior of
corporate actors, particularly when those actors are bent on engaging in
economically inefficient action, whether by failing to diligently and
carefully discharge their duties pursuant to the corporate contract with
betrayed our fundamental constitutional values and undermined our fealty to nondiscrimination principles. . . . [I]n that regard, the mass media has a central role.”).
87. See, e.g., Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P. Fuchs, Publicity, Pressure, and
Environmental Legislation: The Untold Story of Availability Campaigns, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2147 (2009) (describing the impact of journalists on public perception of the debate
over climate change and the consequent impact on legislation).
88. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the
News Media, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1091 (2005) (arguing that news media helped reframe
debates about bankruptcy law and legislation).
89. See, e.g., Donald R. Simon, Big Media: Its Effect on the Marketplace of Ideas and
How to Slow the Urge to Merge, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 247, 251 (2002)
(discussing the ways that big media mergers tend to impoverish public discourse and the
marketplace of ideas).
90. See, e.g., Borden, The Role of Financial Journalists in Corporate Governance, 12
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 311 (2007) [hereinafter Borden, Financial Journalists];
Damian Tambini, What Are Financial Journalists For?, 11 JOURNALISM STUDIES 158
(2010) (questioning the degree to which financial journalists understand their role in
corporate governance); Cheryl L. Wade, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Ethical Corporate
Climates: What the Media Reports; What the General Public Knows, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 421 (2008) (addressing the news media’s role in informing the public about
corporate ethics).
91. Borden, Financial Journalists, supra note 89.
92. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 207-10 (2004) (explaining the
weaknesses in the system of shareholder voting, its negligible frequency, and SEC proposals
to strengthen it); id. at 45-48 (explaining both the procedural hurdles and substantive rules
of law that inhibit shareholders from successfully pursuing claims against managers and
directors in derivative actions); Michael Klausner, The Limits of Corporate Law in
Promoting Good Governance, in RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 91-93 (Jay W.
Lorsch, Leslie Berlowitz & Andy Zelleke eds., 2005) (explaining the general weakness of
shareholder voting and derivative actions as disciplinary mechanisms).
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shareholders, by wrongfully appropriating corporate assets, or by harming
society at large. In a 2005 article, Michael Klausner argued that scholars
should focus their attention upon extralegal forms of enforcement in order
to generate new insights that might contribute to a better culture of
corporate governance and adherence to law.93 Many scholars explored the
role of gatekeepers—non-governmental actors such as lawyers, bankers,
certified public accountants, and securities analysts–in preventing corporate
wrongdoing.94 A few articles explored the concept of “shaming” to restrain
the instincts of corporate actors.95 My article focused on journalists.
Journalists perform various functions, including: investigating fraud,96
catalyzing the legal process by calling wrongdoing to the attention of
governmental actors and private lawyers,97 promoting deterrence through
shaming,98 and affecting the legislative process.99 For each of these
categories, the article chronicled actual cases in which journalists
succeeded in influencing corporate law and governance. In one other
category, the role I posited for journalists was purely speculative. I
hypothesized that journalists could influence the standard of review in
Caremark cases involving director liability for failure to monitor illegal
93. Michael Klausner, The Limits of Corporate Law in Promoting Good Governance,
in RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 97-98 (Jay W. Lorsch, Leslie Berlowitz &
Andy Zelleke eds., 2005)
94. See, e.g., Jill. E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst As Agent:
Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1040-56 (2003) (analyzing
the role of security analysts in identifying and preventing corporate wrongdoing); see
generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 353-360 [hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure)
(discussing the pros and cons of attorneys serving as gatekeepers); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002)
[hereinafter Coffee, Understanding Enron] (discussing the apparent failure in the market for
gatekeepers).
95. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 959, 966 (1999) (“[I]ncreasing evidence suggests that well-crafted shaming
sanctions-especially as applied to top-level corporate executives-can serve as an effective
influence on individual and corporate behavior.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and
Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1268 (1999) (stating that reports highlighting
shortcomings of directors, “with their consequence of shaming and the loss of esteem, may
have been one factor in making directors more attentive.”); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A.
Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 42 J. L. & ECON. 365 (1999) (discussing the deterrent effects of shaming federal
white-collar offenders).
96. Borden, Financial Journalists, supra note 89, at 332-56.
97. Id.; see also Michael J. Borden, PSLRA, SLUSA, and Variable Annuities:
Overlooked Side Effects of a Potent Legislative Medicine, 55 MERCER L. REV. 681, 715
(2004) (“Beginning in early 1998, reporters in the financial press began to call attention to
the problem of annuities being sold into qualified plans.”).
98. Borden, Financial Journalists, supra note 89, at 332-56.
99. Id.
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behavior in the interior of a corporation. I suggested that if journalists are
regularly able to discover corporate wrongdoing before the corporation’s
compliance program is able to learn about it and report it to the board, then
there is good reason to believe that the good faith standard of Caremark
and its progeny is defective and should be changed.100 This claim rests on
the evident laxity of the Caremark standard and the consequent suspicion
that it strips corporate boards of any incentive to ensure that compliance
programs are more than paper tigers. Since a vibrant and well-designed
compliance program should know what is going on within a corporation, it
stands to reason that cases in which journalists, operating without subpoena
power, are able to learn more than the inside monitors deserve a close look
by the courts. In derivative actions, however, courts rarely examine how
the compliance program actually functions. As we have seen, this is a
result of the pleading standards in a derivative action, including the demand
requirement, together with the fact that plaintiffs are not entitled to
discovery until they have survived the demand phase.
To be sure, there may be cases in which compliance programs are
carried out with vigor and integrity, and yet still fail to discover the actions
of determined and furtive malefactors. In such instances, journalistic
reporting may not be instrumental in a shareholder derivative action, but
may nonetheless lead to a governmental legal process that benefits society
by putting an end to the illegal activity.101
III.

JOURNALISTS CAN MONITOR COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

Journalists can be very effective in detecting corporate misbehavior.
There are, however, limits to the kinds of contributions journalists can be
expected to make to corporate law and corporate governance; for example,
while they may not be able to detect merely inefficient management, they
may be good at detecting affirmative wrongdoing. Journalists do so in a
variety of ways. They cultivate contacts within both corporations and
governmental agencies, receive information from leakers or
whistleblowers, and use their skepticism and diligence to process large
amounts of information from various sources, piecing together disparate
fragments of data to create a coherent picture of what is happening within a
corporation or an industry.
Still, some might doubt the wisdom of relying on journalists to
promote good corporate governance. For example, journalists are not
experts in law. They might over-sensationalize a story, which has, at its
100. Id. at 343-50.
101. See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003)
(involving journalistic reporting by both The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg News).
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foundation, unflattering, albeit legal, behavior. Furthermore, many of the
best journalists work within institutions that sometimes have interests that
impede a journalist’s work. For example, the fear of a libel action can
cause an editor to spike a story. This is what happened in Dirks v. SEC,102
an insider trading case that illustrates the role of financial journalists in
corporate governance. In Dirks, a company called Equity Funding was
engaged in a massive financial fraud.103 An employee named Ronald
Secrist informed Raymond Dirks, a securities analyst covering the
company, about the scheme.104 Dirks quickly called William Blundell, a
Wall Street Journal reporter he knew, hoping the Journal would run a story
on Equity Funding and that the SEC would, in turn, investigate the
company.105 Blundell’s editors refused to publish Blundell’s story, fearing
a libel suit.106 The information finally came out, but in a roundabout
fashion that led to Dirks being investigated for insider trading violations.107
The saga of Secrist, Dirks, and Blundell stands as a cautionary tale about
the limitations on journalists’ ability to affect corporate law and
governance.
Another impediment to journalists’ monitoring is their lack the
resources and expertise. Securities analysts, some would argue, are in a far
better position to uncover the kinds of accounting and securities fraud that
lie at the heart of many Caremark cases. Securities analysts have much
greater technical expertise than financial journalists, are paid to focus on a
small number of firms within a particular industry, have greater access to
chief financial officers and other top executives, and have financial
incentives to know the truth about a company’s financial status. In sum,
securities analysts’ position with respect to resources, expertise, access, and
incentives suggests that journalists are unlikely to add any value to the
search for truth in corporate financial reporting. Nevertheless, we must not
forget that executives at Enron successfully deceived the securities analysts
for years before journalists revealed their accounting and securities fraud.108
Indeed, the superiority of securities analysts over journalists is but one
of two major reasons why Caremark cases involving accounting or
securities fraud are not good candidates for a journalistic contribution. The
second reason stems from public corporations’ substantial redundancy in
the development, review, and reporting of financial information.
102. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
103. Id. at 649-50.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 650-51.
108. See Borden, Financial Journalists, supra note 89, at 335-38 (discussing Jonathan
Weil’s groundbreaking investigation of Enron after years of fraud).
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Companies generate their own financial numbers, which are audited by
independent auditors. Part of the audit includes a review of internal
controls, the systems in place to prevent accounting fraud. There is internal
generation of data, which includes internal controls, followed by outside
review by independent auditors; finally there is the requirement by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that the audited financial statements be certified by the
CEO and CFO, both of whom are typically board members. Given the
layers of scrutiny already applied to corporations’ internal controls, a
journalist may not be able to find information not already caught in the
company’s own wide reviewing net.
This is not to suggest that some corporations are not guilty of
fraudulent financial reporting. Rather, given the rigidly structured review
of the financial reporting process, it is highly unlikely that journalists will
be able to outperform the internal monitors. If there is fraud in financial
reporting, the insiders are very likely to know about it. Of course,
accounting and securities fraud can be perpetrated without the board’s
knowledge. In such cases, however, it is much more likely that the
securities analysts will detect the fraud than that journalists will.109
Nevertheless, as the rest of this article will show, journalists can play an
important role in Caremark litigation, and in so doing, can both enhance
shareholder welfare and minimize social harm that results from corporate
illegality.
A. Journalists Have Demonstrated an Ability to Shape the Course of
Caremark Litigation.
Two cases brought in recent years demonstrate the capacity for
journalists to influence Caremark litigation. In both of these cases,
journalistic investigations have revealed the kinds of liability-creating
activities that give rise to a Caremark claim. In each case, the journalists
discovered the information before the respective corporation’s compliance
system did and reported the information to the board, supporting the claim
that Delaware’s good faith standard has been insufficient to induce
appropriate monitoring.

109. Enron stands as a surprising counter-example. The perpetrators of financial fraud
at Enron were, for various reasons, able to hoodwink both analysts and SEC examiners
alike. It was actually a journalist from a regional edition of The Wall Street Journal who
was able to piece together disparate strands of Enron’s financial disclosure and accounting
methods to demonstrate that Enron was reporting inflated earnings. The article he wrote was
the first in a cascading series of revelations that unfolded over a period of months, leading to
the implosion of the company. Borden, Financial Journalists, supra note 89, at 335-38.
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McCall v. Scott was a shareholder derivative action brought against
the directors of Columbia/HCA, a corporation that operated 45% of all forprofit hospitals in the United States.110 HCA had become the target of
multiple federal investigations for fraud. Management had set aggressive
targets for profit growth across its network of hospitals.111 The plaintiffs
alleged that the firm could only meet these growth targets by violating
federal Medicare and Medicaid laws and regulations.112 Specifically, the
plaintiffs alleged that HCA113 employees engaged in widespread
“upcoding”—billing Medicare and Medicaid for more costly interventions
than those actually required or provided.114
The district court dismissed the derivative action for failure to satisfy
the demand requirement, ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to show “that a
majority of the directors were interested or lacked independence.”115 The
Delaware circuit court reversed this dismissal under the demand futility test
of Rales v. Blasband,116 which the circuit court interpreted as requiring a
determination of “whether or not the particularized factual allegations . . .
create a reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint is filed, [a
majority of] the board of directors could have properly exercised its
independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a
demand.”117 The circuit court held that plaintiffs can establish such
reasonable doubt when the “particularized allegations in the complaint
present ‘a substantial likelihood’ of liability on the part of the director.”118
In so holding, the court pushed the demand inquiry beyond the sterile
principle of director independence to include consideration of the facts of
the case and their likelihood of satisfying the substantive legal standard of
the cause of action.
In reviewing the allegations, the circuit court paid careful attention to
an astonishing bit of investigative journalism on the part of three reporters
from The New York Times.119 The Times’ investigation included a
sophisticated statistical analysis of over 30 million records of Medicare
110. McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2001).
111. Id. at 819.
112. Id.
113. The alleged wrongdoing occurred before the merger of Columbia Health System,
Inc. and HCA.
114. Id. at 814.
115. Id. at 815.
116. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993).
117. McCall, 239 F.3d at 816.
118. Id. at 817 (quoting Rales, 634 A.2d 927).
119. Martin Gottlieb, Kurt Eichenwald and Josh Barbanel, Biggest Hospital Operator
Attracts
Federal
Inquiries,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
28,
1997,
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/28/business/biggest-hospital-operator-attracts-federalinquiries.html.
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patients treated in hospitals in Florida and Texas in 1995.120 This enormous
data set included both patients treated by HCA and, for comparison,
patients treated by other providers.121 In this remarkable study, the
reporters:
[M]atched records of these patients with bills for hospital
readmission, admissions to rehabilitation and skilled nursing
units, outpatient services and doctor bills within 30 days of
discharge. To account for differences among patients, hospital
stays were grouped into 1,500 categories that took into account
the type and severity of patient conditions. Costs figures and
referral rates were then calculated and adjusted to account for
differences in conditions.122
During the course of the investigation, the Times reporters met with
unidentified HCA officials to discuss their reporting.123 They also
contacted the federal Medicare agency, which pursued its own
investigation.124 Eventually, the FBI conducted an extensive investigation
that culminated in raids of several HCA offices in 1997.125 The Times
refrained from publishing its story until the FBI undertook the first of its
raids. In 2002, Columbia/HCA completed its settlements with a host of
governmental agencies, paying a total of nearly $1.7 billion.126
Because of the procedural posture of the case, the circuit court opinion
did not include any findings of fact concerning whether the board had
learned from internal channels about the upcoding activities before the
Times reporters discovered it. Nevertheless, the court relied heavily on the
Times report and the federal criminal investigation it sparked to reach its
conclusion. The court found that, under the demand futility test of Rales v.
Blasband, the plaintiffs’ allegations presented a substantial likelihood of
liability on the part of the directors and thus raised a reasonable doubt that
a majority of the board could exercise its independent and disinterested
business judgment in responding to a demand.127 The derivative action
settled in 2003 for an undisclosed sum, with HCA also agreeing to
significant changes in the structure and operation of its compliance
program.128
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
C1.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Associated Press, Hospital Chain Ends Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002 at
McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2001).
N.Y.C. COMPREHENSIVE ANN. FIN. REP. OF THE COMPTROLLER, at xiv (2003),
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McCall thus shows that where courts are willing to consider the actual
allegations of wrongdoing contained in the complaint at the demand stage,
journalistic reporting can crucially affect plaintiffs’ ability to have their
case heard and obtain a recovery. Moreover, the settlement indicates that
compliance at HCA was not satisfactory. The alterations to the compliance
program would not have occurred without the investigative work of the
journalists and the court of appeal’s willingness to overrule the district
court on the issue of demand futility.
In re SFBC International Securities and Derivative Litigation129
presents another case where journalists were the first to uncover suspect
corporate activity that led to a Caremark claim. SFBC, which had come to
be known as PharmaNet Development Group, Inc. (“PDG”), managed the
implementation of clinical testing on behalf of pharmaceutical
companies.130 Between 2003 and 2006 PDG operated clinical trials in
Florida and in two cities in Quebec Province, Canada.131 PDG’s business
plan involved rapid growth and expansion, and relied on inducing
pharmaceutical companies to enter into service contracts by assuring them
that PDG could “quickly enlist study participants and process clinical
trials” at its large facilities in Miami and Montreal.132 For a number of
years, PDG’s practices resulted in large profits and impressive growth.
As it turned out, PDG’s clinical practices involved staggering ethical
violations that caused severe health problems for several of its study
participants and endangered the safety of many others.133 In addition, PDG
schemed to conceal its actions by engaging two Institutional Review
Boards134 (“IRBs”), which were unable to render objective analyses of
PDG’s clinical practices because of conflicts of interest.135 One of the
IRBs, known as Lee Coast, shared offices with a subsidiary of PDG.136
Plaintiffs alleged that employees of this IRB were “paid directly by PDG’s
accounting office and that Lee Coast did not maintain its own books and
records.”137 The other, Southern IRB, was owned by the wife of one of the
defendants, a vice president of clinical operations.138 Without an impartial
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/acc/CAFR-FYJun03/CAFR-FY-EndingJune03.pdf.
129. In re SFBC Int’l Sec. and Derivative Litig., 495 F. Supp. 2d 477 (D.N.J. 2007).
130. Id. at 480.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. IRBs are private organizations authorized by the FDA to oversee clinical trials to
ensure safety and compliance with FDA regulations relating to clinical testing processes.
135. In re SFBC, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 480-81.
136. Id. at 481.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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review of the clinical trials, PDG was able to flout FDA regulations,
industry standards, and biomedical ethics, thereby endangering the health
and safety of numerous study participants.
Reporters from Bloomberg News conducted a year-long investigation
of safety issues in pharmaceutical testing.139 Their reporting culminated in
the publication of a 28-page report140 and several follow up stories that
detailed a number of ethical and safety violations, and served as a primary
source for both the plaintiff’s complaint and the court’s analysis of the
case.141 Bloomberg reported that volunteers “participated in more than one
clinical trial . . . at the same time . . . ignoring required waiting periods.”142
In addition, PDG “threatened to arrange federal deportation of Latin
American immigrants who disclosed health risks in clinical trials.”143
Journalists also found that volunteers at a testing center contracted
tuberculosis and were not quarantined, resulting in the spread of the disease
to other study participants.144 The reporters interviewed professors of
medicine from Harvard Medical School and the University of Minnesota
Medical School, who condemned PDG’s practices. One said, “‘[t]hey had
a person coughing up blood, to allow him to expose others to TB is
wrong . . . . I’ve never heard of this happening in a clinical trial before . . . .
I’ve seen TB spread like this in a prison.’”145 Another opined, “‘[t]his story
suggests a serious lapse in the most basic care of patients exposed to a
known communicable disease.
The breach of responsibility is
egregious.’”146
After Bloomberg published its information about PDG, the SEC,
FDA, and the United States Senate investigated the wrongdoing. As a
result of these revelations, PDG shuttered its Miami testing operations, saw
the resignation of its CEO, its president, and its chief legal counsel, and
settled with its shareholders for nearly $30 million.147 As for the derivative
litigation, a district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for
139. David Evans, Michael Smith, and Liz Willen, Big Pharma’s Shameful Secret,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, (Dec. 2005), http://www.dcscience.net/pharma-bloomberg.pdf.
140. Id.
141. In re SFBC, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 481.
142. Id.
143. Michael Smith and David Evans, SFBC Threatens Human Drug Testers for
Disclosing Health Risks, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=&sid=aH1Vx92KNTWA.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Kristy Barnes, Troubled SFBC Changes its Name in Hope of Changing its
Fortunes,
OUTSOURCING-PHARMA.COM,
(Aug.
31,
2006),
available
at
http://www.outsourcing-pharma.com/Clinical-Development/Troubled-SFBC-changes-itsname-in-hope-of-changing-its-fortunes.
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failure to make demand.148 The defendants argued that the complaint failed
to allege that the directors knew or should have known about the improper
activities, relying on the claim that the majority of the board was not
involved in day-to-day operations.149 Quoting heavily from the Bloomberg
report, which furnished the bulk of the allegations in the complaint, the
court excused demand, concluding that all of the directors “faced a
substantial likelihood of personal liability for the misconduct . . .
preventing them from disinterestedly considering a demand by
shareholders.”150
IV. DELAWARE SHOULD CHANGE ITS APPROACH TO DEMAND FUTILITY
AND GOOD FAITH WHEN JOURNALISTS GET THE STORY FIRST
In summary, we have seen that there are significant problems with the
jurisprudence of Caremark. On its face, Caremark seems impotent.151
Fifteen years of litigation experience confirms its inadequacy as an
inducement to vigorous monitoring.152 On a more nuanced level, Caremark
plaintiffs struggle with the overall weakness of the good faith standard,
compounded by the difficulties of demand, especially as applied in cases
like Wood and DeSimone. To a lesser extent, plaintiffs also face a hurdle in
courts’ ambivalent attitude toward red flags.
These elements have combined to make it very difficult for plaintiffs
to get past a motion to dismiss, which courts commonly grant on the basis
of the demand requirement. As a result, the law shields directors from
having to reveal the actual workings of their compliance programs and
leaves them free to remain willfully blind to evidence of illegality.
Furthermore, compliance programs have been allowed to become paper
tigers, resulting in illegal and dangerous corporate conduct causing public
harm.
What, then, can be done about this problem? I have demonstrated that
journalists have a distinct capacity to make important contributions in
Caremark cases. The remarkable reporting of The New York Times in
analyzing a vast data set to demonstrate Medicare fraud was a tour de force
of data analysis in its own right. From the standpoint of legal process, it
proved its value in assisting the federal government in bringing HCA into
conformity with law and reforming its compliance program, while saving
148.
2007).
149.
150.
151.
152.

In re SFBC Int’l Sec. and Derivative Litig., 495 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484-86 (D.N.J.
Id.
Id.
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
See supra Part I.
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the American taxpayer over two billion dollars through the 2002
settlement. The more traditional reporting of Bloomberg News in
uncovering highly dangerous bioethics violations stands as further evidence
of the power of journalists to assist in Caremark litigation. Despite these
impressive achievements, doctrinal and procedural impediments persist in
constraining the potential of journalists to make a real impact in
shareholder derivative litigation, an impact that could enhance shareholder
welfare, improve the quality of compliance programs, and reduce social
harm.
In order to allow journalists to improve the effectiveness of corporate
compliance, courts must alter their approach to several key doctrinal issues.
In this Part, I will suggest changes in the way that courts deal with demand,
red flags, and the overall contours of the good faith doctrine in order to
strengthen Caremark and improve corporate compliance to both improve
shareholder welfare and reduce harm to society caused by corporate law
breaking.
A. Relaxing the Standard for Demand Futility
In order to clear the way for the contributions of journalists to make a
real impact in improving corporate monitoring and compliance with law,
Delaware courts should adopt a slightly more flexible approach to demand
futility where plaintiffs allege facts suggesting that outside monitors (i.e.
journalists) have uncovered corporate illegality before the board appears to
have become aware of it. This will force defendants to reveal just what
information their compliance program has produced, and whether that
information has made its way to the board. The revelation of this
information is essential to ensure that corporate compliance programs are
actually functioning effectively.
As we have seen, there is currently some doctrinal disarray
surrounding the standard for demand futility in cases involving
nonfeasance (i.e. where the board has failed to act, as opposed to cases
involving a challenge to an affirmative board decision). Under McCall v.
Scott, a court will excuse demand if the complaint includes allegations of
fact sufficient to indicate a “substantial likelihood of liability on the part of
[the director].”153 Other recent cases impose a scienter requirement, under
which plaintiffs must show that a majority of the board knew or should
have known that its conduct was improper, with one case holding that to
satisfy this requirement, the pleadings must show that the board knew
about and ignored deficiencies in internal controls within the compliance
153. McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2001).
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program.154
Delaware courts should turn away from the jurisprudence of
DeSimone and embrace the holding of McCall. If DeSimone remains the
law, a well-counseled board will know that plaintiffs will be unable to
successfully argue demand futility if the board is unaware of flaws in a
compliance program’s internal controls. Indeed, a rational board will
gladly avoid a careful assessment of internal controls within the
compliance program. It is important, in this connection, to note that
internal controls in compliance are not the same as internal controls in
financial accounting. In the latter context, corporations have strong legal
and financial reasons to establish and monitor effective internal controls.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the federal securities laws and Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles and Standards loom as the policemen on
that beat. Moreover, it is the job of independent auditors to test, evaluate,
and opine on the effectiveness of these internal controls. But when the law
imports the concept of internal controls to the compliance setting, things
become rather amorphous. It is all too easy for a board to remain
intentionally ignorant of any systematic flaws with internal controls in
compliance, and, given the limitations on discovery, all too difficult for
plaintiffs to plead facts indicating that the board was aware of such flaws
and did nothing about it. Finally, it is worth mentioning that there is
nothing in Caremark to indicate that corporate compliance programs must
have a system of internal controls in the first place.
Rather than follow an approach that shields ineffective compliance
from any judicial scrutiny, I propose that courts follow the McCall
approach to demand, which will excuse demand as futile if plaintiffs can
show a substantial likelihood of liability on the part of the defendant
directors. Since demand is thus tied to the substantive standard for success
on the merits, it is necessary at this stage to consider the substantive
standard for liability—the good faith standard. Recall that under
Caremark, defendants must show that they have established, in good faith,
a reasonably designed compliance program, and that, per Chancellor Allen,
“only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—
such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and
reporting system [exists]—will establish the lack of good faith that is a
necessary condition to liability.”155
It is not difficult to read the foregoing and conclude that a plaintiff
will be unable to surmount the demand requirement in any case in which a
corporation has an active compliance program in place. In fact the

154. DeSimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934-35 (Del. Ch. 2007).
155. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
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empirical experience strongly supports this prediction.156 Nevertheless, the
Sixth Circuit in McCall excused demand on the strength of allegations of
recklessness in ignoring warning signals that indicated widespread fraud on
the part of corporate employees, despite the existence of a compliance
program.157 The Delaware courts should thus adopt a slight modification to
the good faith standard in certain cases.
B. A Change in the Good Faith Standard
In order to further ensure that Caremark’s requirement of a
compliance program becomes a vibrant check on a board’s duty to monitor,
I suggest that Delaware change its approach to the evaluation of claims of
breach of the duty of good faith at the demand and summary judgment
phase. I propose that where the plaintiff alleges that journalists have
uncovered illegal corporate action before the corporation has either
acknowledged the wrongful activity or taken steps to remedy it, the court
should erect a presumption of bad faith. Corporate defendants can rebut
this presumption by showing that the compliance program was aware of the
problem and had begun to take steps to address it, including notifying the
board of material illegality. Plaintiffs should have access to appropriately
limited discovery to investigate the response of the compliance program. If
the defendants were unable to make such a showing sufficient to convince
the trier of fact, then the inefficacy of the compliance program would
amount to a breach of the duty of good faith.
Under this approach, boards will be forced to reveal something of the
workings of their compliance programs. Courts and other observers will
discover how effective the Caremark standard has been in inducing
effective compliance, and can decide whether it needs to be reformulated.
More importantly, Delaware corporations will know that they can no longer
hide behind the legal shield offered by the minimalistic standard for good
faith and the demand requirement. Finally, shareholders and society should
benefit from higher quality compliance programs.
Those who might fear that this change in the good faith standard will
go too far toward making directors personally liable for every naughty act
of corporate employees need not worry. First, the materiality standard
ensures that only serious or widespread wrongdoing will lead to a finding
of bad faith. Second, the proposed change does not require compliance
programs to prevent or stop illegal activities; it only requires heightened
attentiveness and reporting by the compliance department to the board.

156. See supra, Section I.D (discussing the demand requirement).
157. McCall, 239 F.3d at 818-19.
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Only where the external monitoring done by journalists is more effective
than the internal monitoring of the compliance program will the board even
be forced to disclose the actions of the compliance officers.
C. Discovery and the Tools at Hand
The highly limited availability of discovery in the earlier stages of
derivative litigation plays an important role in the case for relaxing demand
requirements where journalistic reporting has uncovered the wrongdoing at
the center of a duty to monitor case. Plaintiffs are not entitled to normal
civil discovery, but Delaware courts consistently exhort them to resort to
the “tools at hand.”158 One such tool is a request for corporate records
pursuant to section 220 of the DGCL.159 However, records requests rarely
yield meaningful information because the plaintiff must know exactly what
document she is seeking when making the request,160 and also because
corporate executives are well-versed in the art avoiding paper trails in the
minutes of board meetings. The other sources of information referred to as
the “tools at hand” are SEC filings and news media reporting.161 In view of
the frequency with which the Delaware courts instruct litigants to pursue
the “tools at hand”, one might expect that information gathered by
journalists would be afforded some special status. Ironically, however, the
Delaware courts persist in dismissing derivative actions while deriding
plaintiffs for relying simply on newspaper reports.162
There may be many cases in which complaints are hurriedly prepared
158. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 248 (Del. 2000) (“A pleader may rely on
factual statements in the media as some of the ‘tools at hand’ . . . .”).
159. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2013).
160. The scope of a section 220 request is much more limited than civil discovery. See
Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 806 A.2d 113, 114 (Del. 2002) (noting that section 220
“does not open the door to the wide ranging discovery that would be available in support of
litigation.”). Rather, a shareholder plaintiff must “make specific and discrete identification,
with rifled precision, of the documents sought.” Brehm, T at 266.
161. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 248.
162. See, e.g., In re Citigroup S’holders Litig., No. 19827, 2003 WL 21384599, *1-3
(Del. Ch. June 5, 2003) (dismissing suit which “[r]el[ied] extensively on information
gleaned from this governmental report and some other news sources . . . .”). But see
Stephen A. Radin, The New Stage of Corporate Governance Litigation: Section 220
Demands, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1287 (2006). Radin offers a thorough exploration of the
recent jurisprudence of section 200 demands. Radin reviews the recent cases involving
requests for records under section 220 and concludes that section 220 affords plaintiffs the
ability to engage in pre-complaint investigation for the purpose of improving the drafting of
complaints. He also notes that “corporations and their counselors accordingly are taking
steps to minimize litigation risk by ensuring that corporate actions likely to be challenged by
shareholders . . . are documented in carefully prepared minutes and board materials ready to
be produced upon receipt of a section 220 demand.” Id. at 1413.
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in a race to the courthouse to win what Chancellor Strine has called the
“filing Olympics.”163 Nuisance suits are, to be sure, a problem. Complaints
that merely recite facts from newspaper articles written in the wake of a
drop in stock price or after corporate wrongdoing has become public
knowledge deserve swift dismissal. It is essential to distinguish the sort of
lazy ex post fact-gathering by plaintiffs’ lawyers bringing marginal suits
from the highly valuable investigative reporting of the kind on display in
McCall and In re SFBC. This sort of newspaper report deserves particular
attention by the courts, and special treatment at the pre-trial stages.
D. Red Flags
The recent cases addressing red flags indicate an inconsistent
approach. At times, the Delaware courts have shown a willingness to take
a nuanced look at evidence that might constitute a red flag.164 Other cases,
like In re Citigroup, demonstrate a judicial inclination to excuse a board’s
neglect of prominent red flags, particularly with large corporations.165 This
tendency appears to reflect two considerations. First, large corporations
with deep pockets are often the subject of nuisance litigation driven by the
profit motive of the law firm that can attain lead counsel status by winning
the race to the courthouse.166 Second, boards of giant corporations by
necessity focus only on the big picture. They meet infrequently and their
outside members have significant other engagements that leave them little
time to follow any but the most important strategic issues. Neither of these
reasons stands up to scrutiny.
As to the problem of nuisance litigation, the restrictive approach to red
flags must be viewed as part of a filtering apparatus which is important
both as a matter of judicial economy and protection of corporate resources.
Yet nothing marks the entire system of shareholder derivative litigation
more than its highly redundant system of procedural obstacles aimed at
thwarting frivolous lawsuits. With so many mechanisms firmly rooted in
corporate jurisprudence, there is no need to gild the lily by turning a blind
judicial eye toward real evidence of red flags that are relevant to a
plaintiff’s claim of a breach of the duty to monitor.
As to the realities of limitations on directors’ attention, given the
163. King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc. 994 A.2d 354, 355 (Del. Ch. 2010).
164. See, e.g., Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., No. CIV.A. 18105 NC,
CIV.A. 18499, 2001 WL 1334182, *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19,2001) (holding that advances made
to affiliates were suspect and sufficient red flags).
165. Citigroup, 2003 WL 21384599, at *2.
166. See Roberto Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without a Foundation,
1991 WL 371124 (LRI), 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991) (arguing that the interests of
plaintiffs’ attorneys in derivative actions are poorly aligned with those of the shareholders).
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many claims made upon their time by big picture considerations both inside
the corporation and in their lives outside the corporation, this concern is
misplaced. It is the job of the compliance department to review all relevant
issues and funnel material concerns to the board. Furthermore, the entire
board need not occupy itself with minor compliance issues. A committee
of the board, perhaps composed of inside directors, could occasionally
review red flag issues brought to their attention by the compliance officer.
A more expansive approach to red flags, then, can function as an
important part of the judicial analysis of the demand issue. If courts are
willing to excuse demand based on a likelihood of liability on the part of
the directors, and if that determination turns on whether the defendants
were reckless in ignoring red flags that ought to have alerted them to illegal
activity, then Delaware courts should keep an open mind about treating
serious journalistic reporting as doctrinally significant red flags and turn
away from the director-friendly biases on display in cases like In re
Citigroup.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing has demonstrated that journalists can and should play
an important role in Caremark litigation. Talented and well-resourced
journalists have displayed an ability to outperform corporate compliance
programs by uncovering socially damaging corporate misdeeds before the
compliance program. In cases like Scott, an ambitious journalistic
investigation enabled the federal government to recover $1.7 billion dollars
lost to Medicare fraud. But the federal treasury is not the only loser in such
cases; shareholders and the public suffer as well. Thus, the deterrent effect
of civil liability must also play a role in improving director monitoring of
corporate illegality. In order for Caremark’s good faith standard to have
more than mere aspirational value, more cases must be able to proceed past
a motion to dismiss so that defendants will be forced to reveal more about
how their compliance programs actually operate. Assertions, in the answer
to a complaint, that there is a compliance program “adequate in design and
concept” to assure that important information gets to the board are not
sufficient. The changes in law recommended in this article will foster a
healthy competition between the outside and inside monitors that will
benefit everyone by reducing socially harmful activity through improved
overall detection of corporate wrongdoing.

